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JUDGMENTS:
NEW MEXICO AND THE ADDITUR
INTRODUCTION
The amount of a jury award in tort litigation is often not what
plaintiff's attorney feels is just in light of evidence he has presented.
Is there any recourse open to him in New Mexico trial procedure
once the verdict is in? Of course, the motion for a New Trial' is
available, as is the motion for a New Trial limited to the issue of
damages.2 However, both of these procedures entail considerable
additional effort should they be granted. One additional alternative
remains open to plaintiff's counsel in some jurisdictions-the
additur.3 The expense and effort involved in this alternative is considerably less for all parties concerned. The trial court merely tells
the defendant to give the plaintiff more money than the jury originally awarded, or plaintiff will receive a new trial. This is not always
the procedure. The alternative of a new trial need not always be open
to the defendant.
If one accepts the premise that conservation of judicial resources
is desirable, additur is the most logical alternative of the three. The
availability of this alternative to New Mexico's trial judges and attorneys is the subject of this comment.
THE LAW TODAY
The existence of any law in New Mexico concerning additur is, at
very best, questionable. Two relatively recent cases comprise New
Mexico's law in this area.4
In the Harris case, the jury returned a verdict of $3,600.00 for
plaintiff. The plaintiff did not feel this to be adequate as he had
presented uncontroverted evidence that he had incurred medical expenses in an amount over $3,000.00 plus $2,000.00 worth of damage
to his automobile. His damages also included pain and suffering,
future medical expenses, as well as a $600.00 bill for a rented car. He
1. See N.M.R. Civ. P. 59.
2. See Hammond v. Black, 77 N.M. 209, 213, 421 P.2d 124, 127 (1966).
3. "Where a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant (under certain circumstances) is so
small as plainly to manifest prejudice or an arbitrary or capricious disregard of the evidence
or instructions of the court, it is held in some cases -that the court may condition the
overruling of a motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial upon the opponent of the
motion consenting to an increase of the verdict (additur or increscitur) to an amount
deemed by the court to accord with the law and the evidence." F. Busch, Law and Tactics
in Jury Trials § 600, at 1116 (1949).
4. Jones v. Pollock, 72 N.M. 315, 383 P.2d 271 (1963) and Harris v. Cotton, No. 641
(N.M. Ct. App., Apr. 2, 1971), cert. denied, No. 9249 (N.M. Sup. Ct., May 5, 1971).
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therefore moved the court to grant an additur or in the alternative a
new trial. The Honorable Paul F. Larrazolo presided in the case in the
Bernalillo County District Court and granted an additur of
$5,400.00. A motion for a new trial was granted in the alternative.
The defendants failed to file the additur within the specified time,
and a new trial was ordered. The defendants appealed the order
granting a new trial, and the plaintiff moved for dismissal. The court
of appeals dismissed, and the defendants petitioned the New Mexico
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari, which was denied.
The real issue, of course, was the ability of defendants to appeal
an order granting a new trial. However, implicit in this dismissal by
the court of appeals and the denial of certiorari by the supreme court
was a recognition that trial courts in New Mexico have discretion to
grant an additur or a new trial in the alternative.
In Jones, the jury returned an award of $3,800.00. The plaintiffs
had shown undisputed medical expenses of over $11,000.00 in addition to the other types of damages normally sought in tort litigation.
"Plaintiffs. . . filed a motion in three alternatives: (1)that an additur
be granted; (2) that a new trial limited to the issue of damages only
be granted; and (3) that a new trial on all issues in the case be
granted. The motion was denied [and] [p] laintiffs appealed." ' The
court felt the only issue was whether the lower court committed
error in failing to grant a new trial, thereby accepting an obviously
inadequate award: "[W] here it is shown, as it is here, that the verdict
of the jury on the question of damages is clearly not supported by
substantial evidence adduced at the trial of the case, a motion for a
new trial should be granted, and not to do so is an abuse of discretion by the court." It is reversible error for a trial court to accept
a verdict clearly unsupported by substantial evidence. The Jones case
was ".... remanded to the district court with direction to set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial as to all issues. '
Taking the two cases together, we get the very strong implication
that a trial court must not accept a clearly inadequate verdict, that it
has discretion to grant a new trial conditioned upon the unacceptability of an additur, and that it is reversible error not to exercise this
discretion.
It can be said, then, that adidtur is available to New Mexico's
courts and lawyers. Admittedly, the authority is not crystal clear.
The usual procedure when confronted with a similar situation is to
look to other jurisdictions for support. If we do this concerning the
5. Jones v. Pollock, 72 N.M. 315,316, 383 P.2d 271, 272 (1963).
6. Id. at 318, 383 P.2d at 274 (1963).
7. Id.
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power of trial court to grant an additur where the amount in question is undisputed, we find twelve jurisdictions in accord.' We could
say, then, that at least twelve jurisdictions lend their support to New
Mexico's position when, as in both the Jones and Harris cases, the
amount of at least part of the damage incurred by the plaintiff is
undisputed, and the verdict returned is substantially less than the
amount of undisputed damages. However, it must again be admitted
that this area of the law is in need of clarification.
FUNCTIONS OF THE ADDITUR
Additur can serve to protect the rights of plaintiffs. Accepting the
premise that the purpose of Tort Law is to adequately compensate
an injured party for a wrong done, a judge could provide this protection should the jury render a verdict in a case containing evidence
substantiating a higher award.
Additur can also serve to remedy inconsistencies in jury activities
inherent in the system. For example, the jury in the Jones case found
for plaintiff on the issue of liability, but grossly undercompensated
him. It is inconsistent to find a defendant liable for his act, and yet
not compensate the party to whom he is liable when that party has
shown, undisputedly, just how much the defendant is liable to him.
The administration of the judicial system at the trial level can be
greatly facilitated through use of the additur. One aspect of administration where it could be most useful is in the area of jury instruction. The ability to grant an additur would permit a trial judge to
rectify a verdict rendered in obvious disregard of the instructions. 9
A second aspect where additur would be effective is in the area of
the directed verdict. As the system now operates, the jury is able to
"second guess" the court on the issue of liability when the court has
granted a directed verdict. The jury does so by awarding only
nominal or no damages to the plaintiff regardless of what damages he
has shown. This is exactly what occurred in Watkins v. The State of
New Mexico. 1 The case involved a wrongful death action caused by
a fire resulting from negligence on the part of the New Mexico State
Hospital. The court granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict,
and the matter went to the jury solely on the issue of damages. The
jury returned a verdict of $2.00. They had no verdict in which they
could award plaintiff nothing, or perhaps this would have been the
8. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213, 233 (1957).
9. "The basic policy reason for additur and remittitur is the court's control over the jury
by determining the bounds within which the jury may operate, and by modifying the
verdict so that it comes within these bourds .. " 15 Drake L. Rev. 23 (1965).
10. No. 39986 (Dist. Ct Santa Fe County, filed Aug. 28, 1968).
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case. The plaintiff moved the trial court for an additur or in the
alternative a New Trial limited only to the issue of damages or in the
alternative a New Trial as the plaintiff did in Jones. The trial court
ruled against plaintiff on the motion. However, were the law clear on
the trial court's ability to grant the additur, the result could conceivably have been the opposite. In any case, the jury has the ability
to successfully undermine the court's ruling on liability as the system
stands. The ability of the trial court to grant an additur would allow
it to make its directed verdict on the issue of liability mean something and correct this inconsistency in the system.
The present state of the law usually prompts one side or the other
to appeal the case. In New Mexico, when the plaintiff appeals and
wins, the result is a new trial limited to the issue of damages only. 1 1
In other jurisdictions, again depending on the circumstances of the
case, the appellate court will grant an additur.1 2 In the event a new
trial is granted, a great deal of time and effort has been expended in
arriving back to where the issues arose-the trial court. In the event
the appellate court grants the additur, which could have been
granted by the trial court, needless effort and time has still been
taken preparing the appeal.1 3 The additur could remedy this situation. If the trial court could clearly grant additur, or in the alternative a new trial, congestion, at least at the appellate level, could be
and the system would be making better use of its realleviated
1
4
sources.
OBJECTIONS TO THE ADDITUR
Objections to additur usually s focus around our constitutional
guarantee of a right to trial by jury.1 6 However, upon closer examination, most cases adhering to this view of additur involve damages
not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, "...in no
11. See Hammond v. Black, 77 N.M. 209, 213, 421 P.2d 124, 127 (1966).
12. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 213, 255 (1957).
13. "A case that reaches a reviewing court has already cost both the plaintiff and defendant a considerable sum of money, even though the plaintiff may have a contingent
arrangement with his attorney.... A reviewing court may not bring the parties into court
and force them to consider a settlement of the litigation. A trial court, on the hearing of the
motion for a new trial, will be able to bring pressure on the parties to increase the jury's
award and to accept... the 'additur'...." Mooney, Additur-A Court's Power to Increase
the Amount of a Verdict in a Negligence Case, Ins. L. Rep. 389 (July, 1966).

14. "The social and economic costs of overcrowded court dockets increase in geometric
proportions.... The situation is rapidly becoming critical and solutions such as additur
must be speedily employed." Comment, Additur-Procedural Boon or Constitutional

Calamity, 17 De Paul L. Rev. 175, 193 (1967).
15. For an objection that is seldom heard, see 8 Santa Clara Lawyer 123 (1967), in
which the author expressed fear that the additur will lead to forced settlement of cases
rather than trial by jury.
16. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
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sense can be said to be included in the verdict."'1 7 In Sarvis v.
Folsom' 8 the court stated: "We hold in line with what we consider
to be the better rule and the weight of authority that in actions at
law involving controverted and unliquidated damages, courts are
without power to require a party to consent to an additur as a
condition to refusal to grant a new trial" (emphasis added).
This was not the situation in either the Jones or Harris cases as
pointed out above. In those cases, certain amounts of damages were
undisputed, were supported by the evidence, and had to be included
in the verdict upon a finding for plaintiff on the issue of liability, yet
the award was well below those amounts.
The distinction seems to lie in the reason for altering a verdict. A
patent substitution of the judge's idea of what the verdict ought to
have been has never been tolerated. But a correction by the judge as
to the substance or form of the verdict seems to be acceptable. "[I] t
is the duty of the judge to look after [the verdict's] form and substance, so as to prevent a doubtful or insufficient finding from passing into the records of the court.... The judge cannot, under the
guise of amending the verdict, invade the province of the jury or
substitute his verdict for theirs."' 9 The Supreme Court of the
United States in Dimick v. Schiedt2 0 recognized this principle stating: "[WI here the verdict is too small, an increase by the court is a
bald addition of something which ... no jury has ever passed upon
either explicitly or by implication .... [and] compel[s] the plaintiff
to forego his constitutional right to the verdict of a jury ... "2 1
However, when the judge grants an additur in an amount which
coincides with the evidence presented in a case in which the jury has
passed upon the question of liability, it is not an addition of something the jury has not passed on. The jury has passed upon the
defendant's liability and, when the plaintiff has undisputedly shown
the amount of that liability, the judge is not violating the Seventh
Amendment if he grants an additur making the award conform with
the finding of liability.
This may explain the apparent conflicts which exist even within
the same jurisdiction, as well as the attention paid to the particular
circumstances of each case by appellate courts. The question is re17.

Id. at 486.
18. 114 So.2d 490, 492 (Fla. 1959).
19. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 1094, at 758 (1945).
20. 293 U.S. 474,486 (1935).
21. See Bender, Additur- The Power of the Trial Courts to Deny a New Trial on the
Condition That Damages be Increased, 3 Calif. W. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1967), for a similar
interpretation of the Dimick decision.
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solved upon determination of what the trial court was doingreplacing or correcting a verdict.2 2
New Mexico's law as set out in the Jones and Harris cases indicates
that additur should be used to resolve issues when the amount of
damages incurred by the plaintiff is uncontroverted. This being New
Mexico's position, the customary argument involving violations of
the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury do not seem to be in
point. A correction in form or substance is a practice ". . . of long
standing, based on principles of the soundest public policy in the
furtherance of justice..
"23
It is not an infringement of the
Seventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico's appellate courts have probably adopted additur in
this state. However, the law is in great need of clarification if this
valuable tool is to be properly utilized by New Mexico's trial judges
and lawyers. Such clarification can only come from an appellate
court opinion speaking directly to the point 2 4 or by legislative fiat.
Many of our sister states have already granted their trial courts this
discretion applicable under varying circumstances.' 5 New Mexico is
behind her sister states in this regard, and it is time she caught up.
HENRY M. RIVERA

22. "[I]f we bear in mind ... the fact that an increase in amount may be an attempt to
correct a mistake in form or substance, a great deal of the conflict may be resolved."
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 213, 221 (1957).
23. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 1094 (1945).
24. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 31 Wis.2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32
(1966). The effect of this decision upon the law in Wisconsin concerning the additur is
commented upon in Comment, Damages: Rernittiturand Additur in Wisconsin: Bringing the
PowersRule up to Date, 51 Marq. L. Rev. 354, 361 (1967-68).
25. See 56 A.L.R.2d 213, 226 (1957), for cases in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
and Texas.

